International Lawyer
Volume 36

Number 4

Article 12

2002

Supervision of Financial Holding Companies in Europe: The EU
Directive on Supplementary Supervision of Financial
Conglomerates
Michael Gruson

Recommended Citation
Michael Gruson, Supervision of Financial Holding Companies in Europe: The EU Directive on
Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, 36 INT'L L. 1229 (2002)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol36/iss4/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Supervision of Financial Holding Companies in
Europe: The EU Directive on Supplementary
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates
MICHAEL GRUSON*

I. Introduction
On April 24, 2001 the European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive' introducing supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates (the "Proposed Directive"). The Proposed Directive requires a closer coordination among supervisory authorities
of different sectors of the financial industry and leads to changes in the number of existing
directives relating to the supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings, and
investment firms.2
The principal objective of the Proposed Directive is to face the accelerating pace of
consolidation in the financial industry and the intensification of links between financial

*Dr. jur., LL.B., M.C.L., Member of the New York bar; Of counsel and former partner of Shearman &
Sterling.
1. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate and Amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC
and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, 2001
O.J. (C 213) E/07.
2. The Proposed Directive requires changes in the following directives:
(1) First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Direct
Insurance Other Than Life Assurance, 1973 O.J. (L 228) 3 [hereinafter First Non-Life Insurance Directive].
(2) First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Direct
Life Assurance, 1973 OJ. (L 63) 1 [hereinafter First Life Assurance Directive].
(3) Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Insurance Other Than Life Assurance and Amending
Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Third Non-life Insurance Directive), 1992 O.J. (L 228)
1 [hereinafter Third Non-Life Insurance Directive].
(4) Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Life Assurance and Amending Directive 79/267/
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markets. Over the past years, a number of cross-sector groups combining insurance companies, banks, and investment firms have been created and have become of significant importance in the European Union (EU). Such groups straddle traditional sectoral boundaries.' Combined financial operations may create new prudential risks or exacerbate existing
ones. 4 Laws and regulations in the different financial sectors have traditionally adopted
different approaches with different definitions of capital, different types of risks, and different capital requirements.5 For instance, insurance supervisors have historically been primarily concerned with the liability side of the balance sheet as the main source of risk,
although assets are monitored too.6 Regulations in the banking sector regard the asset side
of the balance sheet as the principal source of risk, although examining the source of funding
is an important aspect of the supervisory process. 7 Securities supervisors require securities
firms to have sufficient liquidity to repay promptly all liabilities at any time.' The scope for
potential supervisory problems increases if a financial conglomerate spans a number of
financial markets due to the web of financial interrelationships characteristic for financial
conglomerates. On the other hand, such conglomerates may gain financial solidity by diversifying that risk.9 The Proposed Directive intends to ensure the stability of the European
financial market, establish common prudential standards for the supervision of such financial groups throughout Europe, and introduce level playing fields and legal certainty between financial institutions."'

EEC and 90/619/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive), 1992 Oj. (L 360) 1 [hereinafter Third
Life Assurance Directive].
(5) Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the Capital Adequacy of Investments Firms and
Credit Institutions, 1993 Oj. (L 141) 1 [hereinafter Capital Adequacy Directive].
(6) Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on the Investment Services in the Securities Field,
1993 Oj. (L 141) 27 [hereinafter Investment Services Directive].
(7) Directive 98/78/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on the
Supplementary Supervision of Insurance Undertakings in an Insurance Group, 1998 Oj. (L 330)
1 [hereinafter Insurance Groups Directive].
(8) Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 Relating
to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 2000 Oj. (L 126) 1 [hereinafter
Banking Directive].
3. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate and Amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/
267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/ECof
the European Parliament and the Council, 2001 Oj. (C 213) E/07 [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum],
at 2, sub. 1.
4. Id.
5. Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities, and Insurance Regulators, The SupervisionofFinancialConglomerates
UJuly 1995) [hereinafter Tripartite Report], at 39; Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, Supervision of
FinancialConglomerates(Feb. 1999), at http://www.bis.org/pub1/bcbs47.htm [hereinafterJoint Forum Report],
at 6, sub. 6. The Tripartite Group was formed at the initiative of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(Basle Committee) in early 1993 to address a range of issues relating to the supervision of financial conglomerates. The Joint Forum was established in early 1996 under the aegis of the Basle Committee, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAS) to take forward the work of the Tripartite Group.
6. Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 16, sub. 41.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2, sub. 1.
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The basic philosophy of the Proposed Directive is that the solo supervisions of individually regulated entities should continue to be the foundation for effective supervision, but
that the various supervisors need to establish a coordinated approach in order that prudential assessment can also be made from a group-wide perspective."
It should be remembered that EU directives generally are not directly applicable in the
Member States, but must be transformed into national law. Directives are addressed to the
Member States and bind them in terms of the objectives to be achieved. However, in many
cases the Member States are granted discretion with respect to the method by which the
objectives will be accomplished in their respective national legislation.
Furthermore, the Proposed Directive constitutes only a proposal by the Commission and
still must pass the Council and the European Parliament where the text is discussed at present.
It is anticipated that the Proposed Directive will finally be adopted in December 2002.12 A
number of interested parties have commented on the text and proposed amendments."

11. Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 16, sub. 42.
12. European Commission, Progress on the Action Planfor FinancialServices, Annex at 10, available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/finances/actionplan/annex.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2001). For possible amendments by the European Parliament, see European Parliament Report A5-0060/2002 and for the
position of the European Council, see SEC/2002/995 final.
13. See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 September 2001 at the Request of the Council
of the European Union on a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial
Conglomerate and Amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/
EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council,
2001 OJ. (C 271) 6 [hereinafter Opinion of the European Central Bank]; Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate and Amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC
and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, 2002
OJ. (C 36) 1 [hereinafter Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee]; Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment
Firms in a Financial Conglomerate and Amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC,92/49/EEC,
92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, COM 2001 213 final [hereinafter Report of the European Parliament's Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs]; Finnish Delegation, Note No. 14019/01 to the Working Party on Financial
Services-(Conglomerates) on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a
Financial Conglomerate and Amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/
EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and
the Council (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/stl4/14019enl.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Note of the Finnish Delegation]; Presidency of the Council of the European
Union, Report No. 14140/1/01 to the Permanent Representatives Committee/Council on the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate and Amending Council
Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives
98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://
register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/stl4/14140en 1.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Report of the
Presidency of the Council of the European Union]; Position Paper of the Banking Federation of the European
Union on the Proposed Directive on the Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (Oct. 3,2001),
available at http://www.fbe.be/pdf/PositionpaperFiCo.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Position Paper of the Banking Federation of the European Union].
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H. CurrentConsolidated Supervision of Credit Institutions
According to the Banking Directive, 4 consolidated supervision of credit institutions"5 generally
applies to all credit institutions (i) having another credit institution or a financial institution1"

14. Banking Directive, supra note 2, arts. 52(l)-(2). In the Banking Directive several directives, including
Council Directive 92/30/EEC of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated
Basis, 1992 Oj. (L 110) 52, were combined in a single text for reasons of clarity. Regarding the question of
consolidated supervision of credit institutions, the Banking Directive did not make any substantive changes.
The Banking Directive was amended by Directive 2000/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 18 September 2000 Amending Directive 2000/12/EC Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business
of Credit Institutions, 2000 Oj. (L 275) 37, in order to take into account the development of electronic money
institutions by including such institutions in the definition of a credit institution set out in article 1(1) of the
Banking Directive. Electronic money institutions are defined in article l(3)(a) of Directive 2000/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the Taking Up, Pursuit of and Prudential
Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money Institutions, 2000 Oj. (L 275) 39, as credit institutions issuing
means of payment in the form of electronic money.
15. Pursuant to the first subparagraph of article 1(1) of the Banking Directive, supra note 2, credit institution means:
(a) "an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and
to grant credits for its own account"; or
(b) an electronic money institution within its meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC, see text, supra note 14.
For the purpose of supervision on a consolidated basis, credit institution means a credit institution according to
article I(I), first subparagraph, of the Banking Directive, and any private or public undertaking which corresponds to the definition in article l(l), first subparagraph, of the Banking Directive, and which has been
authorized in a third country.
A credit institution may, in addition to deposit taking and lending, engage in any of the activities of Annex
I to the Banking Directive. These activities are set forth infra note 16.
16. Pursuant to article 1(5) of the Banking Directive, supra note 2,financial institution "mean[s] an undertaking other than a credit institution, the principal activity of which is to acquire holdings or to carry on one
or more of the activities listed in points 2 to 12 of Annex I," Banking Directive:
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Lending;
Financial leasing;
Money transmission services;
Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., credit cards, travellers' cheques and bankers'
drafts);
Guarantees and commitments;
Trading for own account or for account of customers in
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, etc.),
(b) foreign exchange,
(c) financial futures and options,
(d) exchange and interest-rate instruments,
(e) transferable securities;
Participation in securities issues and the provision of services related to such issues;
Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related questions and advice as
well as services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings;
Money broking;
Portfolio management and advice; and
Safekeeping and administration of securities.

Point I is acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds. An institution that engages in that activity (and
also makes loans) is a credit institution.Point 13 is credit reference services and point 14 is safe custody services.
It is curious that under the wording of article 1(5) of the Banking Directive, supra note 2 ("... the principal
activity of which is to acquire holdings or..."), an undertaking that holds only, or principally participations
in, undertakings that are not engaged in financial activities (i.e., industrial holding company) qualifies as financial
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as a subsidiary 7 or holding a participation"8 in such institutions, or (ii) whose parent undertaking is a financial holding company." This means that consolidated supervision

institution. See, e.g., for the German approach, § 1(3) Gesetz iiberdas Kreditwesen ofJuly 10, 1961, 1961 BGBI.
I 881, in the September 9, 1998 version 1998 BGBI. 12776, as amended [herein KWG], defining financial
enterprise (Finanzunternebmen)as including such industrial holding companies. See KARL-HEINZ Boos ET AL.,
KREDITWESENGESErZ § 1 (2000). The definition of an industrial holding company as financial institution remains without consequence for purposes of consolidated supervision unless a credit institution is part of the
holding group.
17. According to article 1(13) of the Banking Directive, supra note 2, for the purpose of supervision on a
consolidated basis, the term subsidiary means "a subsidiary undertaking as defined in" article 1(1), Seventh
Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 Based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on Consolidated
Accounts, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1 [hereinafter Consolidated Accounts Directive], and, in addition, any undertaking over which, in the opinion of the competent authorities, a parent undertaking effectively exercises a
dominant influence.
Article 1(1) of the Consolidated Accounts Directive defines the terms parent undertakingand subsidiary undertaking as follows: a parent undertaking is an undertaking
[a.] h[aving] a majority of the shareholders' or members' voting rights in another undertaking (asubsidiary undertaking), or
[b.] h[aving] the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of another undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) and is at the same
time a shareholder in or member of that undertaking, or
[c.] h[aving the right to exercise a dominant influence over an undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking)
of which it is a shareholder or member, pursuant to a contract entered into with that undertaking
or to a provision in its memorandum or articles of association, where the law governing that
subsidiary undertaking permits its being subject to such contracts or provisions..., or
[d.] [being] a shareholder in or member of an undertaking: and a majority of the members of the
administrative, management or supervisory bodies of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking)
who have held office during the financial year, during the preceding financial year and up to the
time when the consolidated accounts are drawn up, have been appointed solely as a result of the
exercise of its voting rights, or
[e.] [being a shareholder in or member of another undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) and controls
alone,] pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or members of that undertaking...
a majority of the shareholders' or members' voting rights in that undertaking.
Article 1(2) of the Consolidated Accounts Directive states that an undertaking may be considered as aparent
undertaking if it (a) "actually exercises a dominant influence over" the subsidiary undertaking, and (b) "the
subsidiary undertaking are managed on a unified basis by the parent undertaking." In any case, the parent
undertaking must hold aparticipatinginterest in the subsidiary undertaking as defined in article 17 of the Fourth
Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Annual Accounts
of Certain Types of Companies, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11 [hereinafter Annual Accounts Directive]. The first
sentence of article 17 of the Annual Accounts Directive defines the term participationas "rights in the capital
of other undertakings, whether or not represented by certificates, which, by creating adurable link with those
undertakings, are intended to contribute to the company's activities." The second sentence of article 17 additionally provides that "[t]he holding of a part of the capital of another company shall be presumed to constitute
a participating interest where it exceeds a percentage fixed by the Member States that may not exceed 20%."
18. According to article 1(9) of the Banking Directive, supra note 2, participation"for the purpose of supervision on a consolidated basis ... mean[s] the ownership, direct or indirect, of 20% or more of the voting
rights or capital of an undertaking."
19. Under the terms of article 1(2 ) of the Banking Directive, supra note 2,financial bolding ompany"mean[s
a financial institution, the subsidiary undertakings of which are either exclusively or mainly credit institutions
or financial institutions, one at least of such subsidiaries being a credit institution."
The term exclusively or mainly does not refer to the activities of the separate subsidiaries but to the whole
group of subsidiaries. Thus, only if most of a financial institution's subsidiaries meet the definitions of credit
institution or financial institution, such financial institution qualifies as financial holding company. The German
KWG, supra note 16, follows the same concept, see BooS ET AL., supra note 16, at § 1.
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is only exercised regarding groups of which the parent companies are either credit institutions or financial institutions. 0
The following diagram shows the credit institutions that are subject to consolidated
supervision under the Banking Directive:
Credit

Institution

/\
20% or more

/\

20% or more

Financial
Institution

Credit
Institut ion

Financial Holding Company
(Financial Institution)

/\
20% or more

/\

Credit

20% or more
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For an understanding of the scope of consolidated supervision under current EU law, it
is important to remember that a financialinstitution is an institution that principally carries
on one or more of the "banking" activities listed in points 2-12 in Annex I to the Banking
Directive2' but that is not a depository institution.22 It is also important to recall that Annex

20. A financial institution having a large credit institution as a subsidiary in many cases would constitute a
financial holding company. However, if a financial institution principally holds participations in the nonfinancial sector and has one or more credit institutions which in the aggregate play a minor role in the group,
the financial institution does not meet the definition of a financial holding company because its subsidiaries do
not exclusively or mainly consist of credit institutions or financial institutions as required in article 1(21). Banking
Directive, supra note 2. Thus, the relative size of the credit institution that is a subsidiary of a financial institution
as compared to the other subsidiaries of the financial institution determines whether the group is subject to
consolidated supervision; the absolute size of the credit institution is not relevant.
2 1. Banking Directive, supra note 2.
22. See text, upra notes 15 and 16.
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I includes not only deposit taking and lending and other more traditional banking activities,
but also activities that in the United States would be considered as investment banking,
such as underwriting, dealing, and brokering.
Consolidated supervision essentially means that the authority supervising the credit institution being part of a group must apply the financial data of the whole group in monitoring compliance by the credit institution with its supervisory standards (such as capital
adequacy, solvency ratio, lending limits, and restrictions on investments by credit institutions in the non-bank sector). 3 As a general rule, the authorities must require full consolidation of all credit and financial institutions that are subsidiaries of a parent undertaking.
However, under certain circumstances, proportional consolidation may be required.14
In cases where the parent of a credit institution is another credit institution, supervision
on a consolidated basis will be exercised by the EU Member State that authorized such
parent undertaking.25 Where the parent undertaking of a credit institution is a financial
holding company, however, consolidated supervision will be exercised by the EU Member
State that authorized the credit institution. 6 This means that the credit institution is always
the addressee of consolidated supervision. However, when a financial holding company
holds credit institution subsidiaries in more than one Member State, supervision on a consolidated basis will be undertaken by the Member State where the financial holding company and one credit institution have been set up.27 If the financial holding company has
been set up in a Member State in which no credit institution subsidiary is located, the
Member States concerned (including the Member State in which the financial holding
company was set up) will have to reach an agreement as to which Member State shall
exercise consolidated supervision." In the absence of such agreement, the supervisingMember State is selected on the basis of the largest credit institution balance sheet and, if that
figure is the same in two or more Member States, on the basis of the first date of authorization of the credit institution subsidiaries29
With regard to the sectors of insurance groups and investment groups, the European
legal framework provides similar consolidated supervision of such groups.30
M.

A.

Determination of Financial Conglomerates and the
Addressees of Supplementary Supervision
GENERAL

The existing EU legal framework for the supervision of financial institutions is incomplete because it only covers the so-called sectoral supervision, that is, supervision over

23. Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 54. For a discussion of the consolidated supervision of credit institutions in the EU, seeMichael Gruson, Prudential Regulation by the European Union, § 6.04, in 2 REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 245 (Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner eds., 3d

ed. 2000).
24. Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 54(1).
25. Id. art. 53(1).
26. Id. art. 53(2).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 2, requires prudential regulation of investment firm groups,
and the Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2, requires additional supervision of insurance groups.
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institutions within a particular sector of the financial industry." Cross-sectoral supervision
of financial groups, combining institutions from different financial sectors, exists only to a
limited extent. 2 The Proposed Directive uses the termfinancialsectortorefer to the banking,
33
insurance, or investment services sector or a combination of all or some of such sectors.
A regulated entity is defined as a credit institution, an insurance undertaking, or an investment firm.14 This definition itself does not require that the regulated entity be located in
the EU, and therefore also includes non-EU entities. However, only regulated entities that
35
have obtained an authorization pursuant to one of the sectoral directives are subject to
supplementary supervision within the meaning of the Proposed Directive. 6 Such an authorization is only required for undertakings that are located in the EU. 7 Thus, supple31. The Banking Directive, supra note 2, provides for consolidated supervision of banking groups; the Capital
Adequacy Directive, supra note 2, provides for prudential regulation of investment firm groups; and the Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2, provides for additional supervision of insurance groups.
32. E.g., Banking Directive, supra note 2, arts. 55(2), 56(4), requires cooperation and exchange of information between the different supervisory authorities if a credit institution, financial holding company, or mixedactivity holding company has as a subsidiary an insurance company or another undertaking providing investment services.
33. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(7). Secoral rules means the EU legislation relating to the prudential supervision, in particular laid down in the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2; the First
Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2; the Insurance Groups Directive; supra note 2; the Capital Adequacy
Directive, supra note 2; the Investment Services Directive, supra note 2; and the Banking Directive, supranote
2. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(6).
34. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(4). For the purpose of the Proposed Directive, the following
definitions apply:
According to article 2(1) of the Proposed Directive credit institution means acredit institution within
the meaning of article 1(I), second subparagraph, Banking Directive, supra note 2 (seetext, supra
note 15).
According to article 2(2) of the Proposed Directive insurance undertaking means an undertaking
within the meaning of First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 6; First Life Assurance
Directive, supra note 2, art. 6; or Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2, art. l(b).
According to article 2(3) of the Proposed Directive, investmentfirm means an investment firm within
the meaning of, Investment Services Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(2): any legal person whose regular
occupation or business it is to provide any investment service for third parties on a professional basis,
i.e., any of the following activities listed in the Annex to the Investment Services Directive: brokerage,
dealing as principal, portfolio management, underwriting, offering underwriting related services, investment advice, making margin loans, and safekeeping and administration. All defining activities are
in connection with certain types of securities and giving advice on capital structure, industrial strategy
and merger and acquisition advice, and providing safe custody services and foreign exchange services
where these foreign exchange services are connected with the provision of investment services. Article
2(3) of the Proposed Directive also includes in the definition of investment firm so-called recognized
third-country invesrmentfirms as referenced in Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 2, art. 2(4). Pursuant to that definition, an undertaking constitutes a recognized third-country investment firm if it
(i) would be covered by the definition of investment firm in article 2(2) of the Capital Adequacy
Directive if it were established within the EU, (ii) is authorized in a third country, and (iii) complies
with prudential rules considered by the competent authorities as at least as stringent as those laid down
in the Capital Adequacy Directive.
35. First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 6; First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2, art.
6; Investment Services Directive, supra note 2, art. 3(l); Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 4.
36. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, arts. I, 4(I).
37. First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, and First Life Assurance Directive, supra note
2, art. 6, require an authorization of insurance undertakings having established their head office within the
territory of a Member State. Article 3(1) in connection with article 1(6) of the Investment Services Directive,
supra note 2, states that only investment firms having their registered office or head office in a Member State
are subject to authorization. Although Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 4, provides for the authorization
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mentary supervision only applies to regulated entities that are established and authorized
in the EU. 8
It is important to note that the Proposed Directive does not replace the existing supervision of the different sectoral groups, but introduces a supplementary supervision of the
regulated entities. This supplementary supervision deals with relations among the single
regulated entities within the group. It does not lead to supervision of unregulated entities
within a group on a stand-alone basis.19

B.

FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES

The Proposed Directive applies directly to certain regulated entities (credit institutions,
insurance undertakings, and investment firms) that have obtained an authorization pursuant
to one of the sectoral directives. 4° If such entities are part of a financialconglomerate, they
are subject to supplementary prudential supervision. 4' In order to determine whether a regulated entity is subject to supplementary supervision, two inquiries must be made: first,
whether the regulated entity is part of a financial conglomerate, and second, whether the
regulated entity is one that is subject to supplementary supervision.
2
According to the Proposed Directive a financial conglomerate is defined as a group of
undertakings. A U.S. observer would say that a group is determined by concepts very similar

of credit institutions prior to commencement of activities in an EU Member State without expressly referring
to the origin of that credit institution, it is clear from the context of the Banking Directive and articles 23 to
25 of the Banking Directive (governing relations with third countries) that only credit institutions established
under the laws of a Member State are subject to authorization pursuant to article 4 of the Banking Directive.
38. If a financial conglomerate is headed by a non-EU entity, the EU-regulated entities are subject to
supplementary supervision according to articles 4(3) & 14 of the Proposed Directive, see infra part IV.E.
39. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(5).
40. First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 6; First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2, art.
6; Investment Services Directive, supra note 2, art 3(1); Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 4.
41. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.
42. According to article 2(11) of the Proposed Directive, a group means two or more natural or legal persons
between whom there are close links. Pursuant to article 2(12) of the Proposed Directive, close links mean links
within the meaning of Third Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(1), Third Life Assurance
Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(m), Investment Services Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(15), or Banking Directive,
supra note 2, art. 1(26). Such a link is given in a situation in which two or more natural or legal persons are
linked by (a) 'participation,' which means direct ownership or by way of control of 20% or more of the voting
rights or capital of an undertaking; or (b) 'control,' which means the relationship between a parent undertaking
and a subsidiary undertaking, in all the cases referred to in articles 1(1) and (2) of the Consolidated Accounts
Directive, see supra note 17, or a similar relationship between any natural or legal person and an undertaking.
Close links exist also in the following situations:
a. a situation in which in the opinion of the competent authorities one or more persons effectively
exercise a dominant influence over another person;
b. a situation in which persons are linked by a participation within the meaning of the first sentence
of the Annual Accounts Directive, supra note 17, art. 17. There, participationis defined as rights in
the capital of other undertakings, whether or not represented by certificates, which, by creating a
durable link with those undertakings, are intended to contribute to the company's activities; or
c. a situation in which persons are linked by a relationship within the meaning of article 12(1) of the
Consolidated Accounts Directive. Such a relationship is given if undertakings are (a) managed on a
unified basis pursuant to a contract concluded between those undertakings or provisions in the
memorandum or articles of association of those undertakings or (b) if the administrative, management, or supervisory bodies of those undertakings consist for the major part of the same persons in
office during the financial year and until the consolidated accounts are drawn up (such undertakings
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to the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act concept of control,'4 whereby control for purposes
of determining a group under the Proposed Directive commences with a 20 percent capital investment. To qualify as a financial conglomerate, such a group must meet the
following conditions:4
(a) Its activities mainly consist in providing financial services in the financial sector;
has obtained an authorization in ac(b) It comprises at least one regulated entity that
4
cordance with one of the sectoral directives;
(c) It comprises at least one insurance or reinsurance undertaking,- and at least one
other entity of a different financial sector; and,
(d) Its cross-sectoral activities in the financial sector referred to in (c) above are significant.
When a group is headed by a regulated entity, it qualifies as a financial conglomerate if
47
it meets clauses (b) to (d), irrespective of the group's ratio set out in clause (a). This means
that clause (a) is only applicable to financial conglomerates that are not headed by a regulated entity. Clause (b) requires a regulated entity with an EU license; clause (c) does not
require that the insurance undertaking or other entity of a different financial sector have
an EU license.
A financial conglomerate, therefore, must contain at least one insurance or reinsurance
company and one regulated entity from another sector of the financial industry. The above

definition of a financial conglomerate contains two measurement criteria:
1. Clause (a) above requires that the activities of the group mainly consist of providing
financial services. This means that the ratio of the consolidated and/or aggregated

are not counted if they are connected by a parent-subsidiary-relation as described in article 1(1) or
(2) of the Consolidated Accounts Directive).
In order to include all relevant groups, no matter how they are structured, a broad definition is used based on
the concept of "close links" as introduced in the past by the so-called post-BCCI Directive (European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29 June 1995 amending Directives 77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC
in the Field of Credit Institutions, Directives 73/239/EEC and 92/49/EEC in the Field of Non-life Insurance,
Directives 79/267/EEC and 92/96/EEC in the Field of Life Assurance, Directive 93/22/EEC in the Field of
Investment Firms and Directive 85/61 I/EEC in the Field of Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (Ucits), With a View to Reinforcing Prudential Supervision, 1995 Oj. (L 168) 7). However,
the concept of close links has been further elaborated in order to cover other groups of entities among which
there are no capital links but that are managed on a unified basis and for which accounting legislation gives
Member States the possibility of requiring consolidated annual accounts. Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 3, at 5, arts. 2, 3. Clause (c) above captures so-called "horizontal groups" or "horizontal financial conglomerates" that have no common parent or capital ties.
43. Section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C § 1841 (2000).
44. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(1 3).
45. First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 6; First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2, art.
6; Investment Services Directive, supra note 2, art. 3(1); Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 4. Such authorization is only required for undertakings established under the laws of an EU Member State. See text, supra
note 37.
46. According to article 2(5) of the Proposed Directive a reinsuranceundertaking means a reinsurance undertaking within the meaning of Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(c): an undertaking, other than
an insurance undertaking or a non-member-country insurance undertaking, the main business of which consists
in accepting risks ceded by an insurance undertaking, a non-member-country insurance undertaking, or other
reinsurance undertakings.
47. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
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balance sheet total of the regulated and non-regulated financial sector entities in the
group to the consolidated and/or aggregated balance sheet total of the group as a
whole, calculated on the basis of the annual accounts, must exceed 50 percent. 48 This
test intends to distinguish between financial and non-financial groups. 49
2. Clause (d) above requires that the cross-sectoral activities in the financial sector are
significant. This means that (i) the average of the ratio of the balance sheet total of the
smallest financial sector to the consolidated and/or aggregated balance sheet total of
the financial sector entities in the group, calculated on the basis of the annual accounts,
and (ii) the ratio of the solvency requirements of the smallest financial sector to the
total solvency requirements of the financial sector entities in the group, must exceed
10 percent.50 Generally speaking, the size of the smallest financial sector must amount
to 10 percent of the total of the financial sector entities. This test intends to distinguish
between financial groups with homogenous financial activities and financial groups
with heterogeneous financial activities. 5 The Proposed Directive intends to cover the
latter groups, the former being covered by the existing sectoral directives"2 on a groupwide basis."s
The competent authorities 4 of the EU Member States may, by common agreement,
lower the ratios of clauses (a) and (d), in particular in the case of groups that are on the
borderline of exclusion from the definition of financial conglomerate. 55 The competent
authorities also may, in a particular case, replace the criterion based on balance sheet total
with the criterion of income structure or off-balance sheet activities or both, or add the
criterion of income structure or off-balance activities or both to the criterion based on
balance sheet total, if the competent authorities are of the opinion that these parameters
6
are of particular relevancei
The Proposed Directive introduces and defines the term mixedfinancial holding company 7
to cover financial conglomerates headed by a non-regulated entity holding company. The

48. Id.
49. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5, sub. 2, arts. 2, 3.
50. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(2). According to article 3(2) of the Proposed Directive, the
smallest financial sector in a financial conglomerate is the sector with the smallest average. For the purpose of
calculating the average, the banking sector and the investment services sector are considered together. The
solvency requirements are to be calculated in accordance with the provisions of the sectoral rules and the
Proposed Directive. Id.
51. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5, sub. 2, arts. 2, 3.
52. See text, supra note 2.
53. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5, sub. 2, arts. 2, 3.
54. Article 2(15) of the Proposed Directive defines competent authoritiesas the national authorities of the EU
Member State, which are empowered by law or regulation to supervise credit institutions, and/or insurance
undertakings and/or investment firms. Thus, the Proposed Directive does not introduce a new authority but
provides cooperation between the existing national supervising authorities, see infra part IV.D.
55. Proposed Directive, supra note 1,art. 3(3)(b).
56. Id. art. 3(3)(c). According to article 3(3)(a) of the Proposed Directive, the competent authority may
exclude a particular entity from the calculation of ratios under the same conditions under which a competent
authority responsible for exercising supplemental supervision may exclude an entity from supplemental supervision pursuant to article 5(4) of the Proposed Directive. See infra part W.A.
57. Article 2(14) of the Proposed Directive defines mixed financialbolding company as a parent undertaking,
other than a regulated entity, which, together with its subsidiaries, of which at least one is a regulated entity
having its head office in the EU, and other entities, constitutes a financial conglomerate.
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definition does not require that mixed financial holding companies must have their head
office in the EU. However, if a financial conglomerate headed by a mixed financial holding
company is to be covered directly by the Proposed Directive, the mixed financial holding
company must be located in the EU. s
Financial Conglomerates:
Group must be mainly engaged in financial activities.
1. Regulated Entity Holding Company
Regulated Entity
Holding Company
(Re-/Insurance Company)

Regulated Entity
Holding Company
(Credit Institution/

Credit Institution/
Investment Firm

2. Non-Regulated Entity Holding Company

58. SeeProposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(b). Financial conglomerates that are headed by a non-EU
company (a regulated entity or a mixed financial holding company) are covered by articles 4(3) & 14 of the
Proposed Directive, seeinfra part ME.
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3. Horizontal Conglomerate
Re-/Insurance

Relationship

Company

Credit Institution/

Investment Firm
(Art. 12(l),
Consolidated Accounts
Directive)

It is noteworthy that a financial conglomerate does not exist if a group is composed only
of credit institutions and investment firms. However, the permitted activities of an investment firm are substantially overlapping with the permitted activities of a financial institution. Thus, in most, if not all cases, an investment firm owning 20 percent or more of a
credit institution or a credit institution owning more than 20 percent of an investment firm
is covered by the current rules on consolidated supervision of credit institutions and financial institutions. For instance, the rules on consolidated supervision of the German banking
law apply to financial institutions and investment firms1 9 Consolidated supervision always
requires the existence of a deposit-taking institution in the group.
From the U.S. experience, it is surprising that conglomerates that are headed by a nonregulated entity holding company are subject to supplementary supervision only if the group
is mainly engaged in financial services in the financial sector, that is, banking, insurance, or
investment services. However, the Proposed Directive goes further than current rules on
consolidated supervision. The current rules require consolidated supervision for credit institutions that are subsidiaries of a credit institution or of a financial holding company, that
is, a company the subsidiaries of which are exclusively or mainly credit institutions or financial institutions and that has at least one credit institution subsidiary.6 0 Consolidated
supervision does not extend to a "mixed-activity holding company," which is defined as a
parent company, other than a financial holding company or a credit institution, whose
subsidiaries include at least one credit institution. 6' Thus, the proverbial steel company that
acquires a bank is not subject to consolidated supervision under current EU law because it
62
is not a financial holding company.
However, the steel company that acquires a bank and an insurance company both together being larger than the steel company, would be a mixed financial holding company
of a financial conglomerate and would be subject to supplementary supervision under the
Proposed Directive. A holding company without its own business activities whose principal
activity consists of acquiring holdings in industrial and financial companies is a financial
institution63 and if the subsidiaries of such a financial institution mainly consist of credit
59. See the discussion of consolidated supervision in Germany in Michael Gruson, Banking Regulation and
Treatment of Foreign Banks in Germany, §§ 8.20-8.25, in 2 REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 23, at 425-446. Investment firms in the meaning of the Investment Services Direc-

tive, supra note 2, may be covered by consolidated supervision as part of a banking group (Institutsgruppe)
(KWG § 10a(2)) because they are financial service institutions (Finanzdienstleistungsinstitute, defined in KWG
§ I(la)) or they may be part of a financial holding group (Finanzholding Gruppe) (KWG § 10a(3)) because they
are financial enterprises (Finanzunternebmen, defined in KWG § 1(3)).
60. Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 52(2). Seetext, supra note 19.
61. Id. art. 1(22).
62. Seetext, supra note 20.
63. Seetext, supra note 16.
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institutions or financial institutions,6 it is a financial holding company and subject to
65
consolidated supervision. If the subsidiaries do not mainly consist of credit or financial
institutions, it is not a financial holding company subject to consolidated supervision. If the
above holding company holds a credit institution and an insurance company and if its
activities mainly consist of providing financial services, it is a mixed financial holding
company and is also subject to supplementary supervision. If its activities do not consist
mainly of providing financial services, it is neither subject to consolidated nor to supplementary supervision.
The non-regulated entity holding company that is the parent of a financial conglomerate
must always be a mixed financial holding company; it must have at least one EU-regulated
66
entity subsidiary that has its head office in the EU.
C.

UNDERTAKINGS

IN THE FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES THAT ARE SUBJECT TO

SUPPLEMENTARY SUPERVISION

The Proposed Directive does not envision that the whole financial conglomerate or all
companies in the financial conglomerate are subject to supplementary supervision. It requires that only the following undertakings that are part of a financial conglomerate be
subject to supplementary supervision in addition to the supervision pursuant to the appli67
cable sectoral rules:

1. Every EU-regulated entity that is at the head of a financial conglomerate,
2. Every EU-regulated entity whose parent undertaking" is a mixed financial holding
company having its head office in the EU, and
3. Every EU-regulated entity in a financial conglomerate linked to another entity by a
relationship within the meaning of article 12(1) of the Consolidated Accounts Direc0
tive, 69 that is, every regulated entity in a horizontal financial conglomerate.

64. See text, supra note 20.
65. Id.
66. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, arts. 1(14), 4(2)(b). If the parent were not a mixed financial holding
company, its regulated entity subsidiaries would not be subject to supplementary supervision. Id.
Note that the Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 36, defines mixed conglomerates quite differently as those
groups which are predominantly commercially or industrially oriented, but contain at least one regulated
financial entity (which is more than merely a "captive" entity doing business only on behalf of the group) in
some part of their corporate structure. Typically, mixed conglomerates would be headed by a commercial or
industrial company (or by an unregulated non-financial holding company) with the regulated entities embedded
downstream in the group structure. The Proposed Directive does not address the issue of such mixed conglomerates. See Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 36-38.
67. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, arts. 4(1), (2). It follows from article 4(2) in connection with article
4(1) ("regulated entities referred to in Article I") and in connection with article I of the Proposed Directive
("... regulated entities which have obtained an authorization pursuant to . . .") that the regulated entities
referred to in (a) to (c) are regulated entities which have their registered office or head office in the EU. See
text, supra note 37.
68. According to article 2(8) of the Proposed Directive, a parent undertaking means a parent undertaking
within the meaning of article I of the Consolidated Accounts Directive, see text, supra note 17, and, in addition,
any undertaking which, in the opinion of the competent authorities, effectively exercises a dominant influence
over another undertaking.
69. See text, supra note 17.
70. See text, supra note 42, at sub (c). Such a relationship between two entities exists when the entities are
managed on a unified basis pursuant to a contract or when the administrative, management, or supervisory
bodies of such entities consist for the major part of the same persons in office.
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As stated above," each regulated entity subject to supplementary supervision must have its
head office in the EU, and the mixed financial holding company heading a financial conglomerate must have its head office in the EU and such financial conglomerate must have at
72
least one subsidiary that is a regulated entity with its head office in the EU. However, even
in the case of a mixed financial holding company having its head office in the EU, the EUregulated entity subsidiaries are subject to supplementary supervision, but not the mixed
financial holding company. If the parent undertaking of an EU-regulated entity is a regulated
entity having its head office outside the EU or a mixed financial holding company having its
head office outside the EU, article 14 of the Proposed Directive applies."
Where a financial conglomerate is a subgroup of another financial conglomerate (the
main financial conglomerate), Member States may apply the provisions of articles 5 to 13
of the Proposed Directive (supplementary supervision) only to the main financial conglomerate and not to the subgroup.14 It appears that the non-financial activities of a mixed
financial holding company could have the effect that the group headed by the mixed financial holding company does not meet the financial conglomerate tests. In that case, one has
to determine whether the non-qualifying group comprises subgroups that qualify as financial conglomerates."
The Proposed Directive gives the competent authorities discretion to enlarge the group
of entities subject to supplementary supervision beyond the entities described in articles
76
4(2) and (3) of the Proposed Directive:
Where persons hold participations or capital ties in one or more regulated entities or exercise
significant.influence over such entities without holding a participation or capital ties, [although
the conditions of articles 4(2) or (3) are not met], the competent authorities shall determine
whether and to what extent these entities together with other entities constitute a financial
77
conglomerate and supplementary supervision is to be carried out to the regulated entities.
It is somewhat confusing that the existence of a financial conglomerate is determined by
the existence of financial and other control relationships (close links), and that the determination of those regulated entities in a financial conglomerate subject to supplementary supervision is also determined by the existence of (other) financial and capital relationships. The
Commission did not choose to use a uniform concept to determine the relation between
entities that would subject such entities to supplementary supervision, such as the use of the
simple but flexible concept of controlof the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.11
71. See text, supra notes 37 & 67.
72. Proposed Directive, sopra note 1, art. 2(14).
73. Id. art. 4(3). See article 14 of the Proposed Directive discussed infra part W.E.
74. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
75. The prohibition of separate regulation of subgroups set forth in the second subparagraph of article 4(2)
of the Proposed Directive does not apply in that case because the subgroup is not a subgroup of another
financial conglomerate.
76. Article 4(3) of the Proposed Directive is discussed infra part IV.E.
77. Proposed Directive, sopra note 1, art. 4(4), Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 6, sub 2,
art. 4, states:
As some groups are not covered by the definitions under Article 2, but do have financial entities with
substantial activities in the financial markets the supervision of which would respond to the objectives
of the Directive, the Directive introduces a basis for competent authorities to submit also these special
group structures to supplementary supervision, on the condition that well defined conditions are met.
78. See Section 2(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (a)(2000); Michael Gruson,
Nonbanking and FinancialActivities of Foreign Banks Operating in the United States, §§ 10.05, 10.06, in 1 REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL, supra note 23, at 688-736.
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In order to avoid possible moral hazards, the Proposed Directive states that the inclusion of unregulated entities or third-country regulated entities in the group-wide supplementary supervision does not mean that these entities are subject to supervision on a standalone basis.19
IV. Supplementary Supervision
The Proposed Directive introduces a series of rules with regard to the supplementary
supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate. They relate in particular to
capital adequacy, s° intra-group transactions and risk concentration,8' and to the management.82 The Proposed Directive also requires EU Member States to ensure that for each
financial conglomerate the competent authority of one Member State is designated to coordinate between the supervisors involved in the group-wide supervision. The competent
authorities are also required to cooperate and exchange information. 3
It must be emphasized that supplementary supervision does not mean supervision on a
consolidated basis like the supervision provided by the sectoral rules. The Proposed Directive follows a so-called "solo-plus" approach to supervision. The basis of supervision is
the supervision of individual group entities on a solo basis by their respective regulators.
The solo supervision of individual entities is complemented by a general quantitative assessment of the group as a whole and, usually, by a quantitative group-wide assessment of
the adequacy of capital.84 The Proposed Directive does not require any additional consolidation of the accounts of the financial conglomerate as a whole if existing EU directives
do not impose such consolidation.
A. CAPITAL ADEQUACY
One of the most important issues regarding the supervision of financial conglomerates
is supervision of the group's financial condition. Therefore, Annex I of the Proposed Directive requires the competent authorities to exercise supplementary supervision of the
capital adequacy of the regulated entities in a financial conglomerate. 5 Eliminating any
inappropriate intra-group creation of own funds such as double or multiple gearing16 or

79. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(5). See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 6, sub 2, art.
4, and Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 36, (the impression that the activities of unregulated entities in the
financial conglomerate are in some way being monitored or supervised, even if only informally, creates a
moral hazard).
80. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 5.

81. Id. art. 6.
82. Id. arts. 18(1), 19(1), 23(1), 25(2).

83. Id. arts. 7-13.
84. Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 17.
85. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(l).
86. According to the Joint Forum Report, supra note 5, at 8, sub. 18, double gearing occurs whenever one
entity holds regulatory capital issued by another entity within the same group and the issuer is allowed to count
the capital in its own balance sheet; multiple gearing occurs when the dependant in the previous instance itself
downstreams regulatory capital to a third-tier entity, and the parent's externally generated capital is geared up
a third time.
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excessive leverage is the major goal of such supplementary group-wide capital adequacy requirements.87 In such situations the same own funds are used simultaneously as a buffer
more than once-to cover the capital requirements of the parent company as well as those
of a subsidiary (and possibly also those of a subsidiary of a subsidiary)."8 Thus, the competent
authorities must require regulated entities in a financial conglomerate to provide own funds
at the level of the financial conglomerate that are always at least equal to the capital adequacy
requirements as calculated in accordance with Annex 1.89 In addition, certain entities in the
financial conglomerate that may not be subject to capital adequacy requirements on a standalone basis must nonetheless be included for the purpose of calculating capital adequacy at
the level of the financial conglomerate. 90

87. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, at Annex I, sub. I, 2(i). See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3,
at 4, sub I(b). The Joint Forum Report, supra note 5, at 9, sub. 23, defines excessive leverage as situations where
a parent issues debt (or other instruments not acceptable as regulatory capital in the downstream entity) and
downstreams the proceeds as equity or other forms of regulatory capital to its regular subsidiaries.
88. Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 17.
89. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
90. Id. art. 5(3) states that "[for the purpose of calculating the capital adequacy requirements .
the
following entities shall be included in the scope of supervision:"
a. financial holding companies within the meaning of article 7(3), first indent, of the Capital Adequacy
Directive, as amended by article 22, first indent, of the Proposed Directive, i.e., financial institutions
whose subsidiary undertakings are either exclusively or mainly investment firms or other financial
institutions at least one of which is an investment firm and which is not a mixed financial holding
company within the meaning of the Proposed Directive;
b. mixed activity holding companies within the meaning of article 7(3), second indent, Capital Adequacy
Directive, as amended by article 22, second indent, Proposed Directive, i.e., parent undertakings, other
than financial holding companies or investment firms or mixed financial holding companies within the
meaning of the Proposed Directive, whose subsidiaries include at least one investment firm;
c. related undertakings of an insurance undertaking within the meaning of article 3(2), first indent, in
connection with Insurance Groups Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(h), i.e., subsidiaries of insurance
undertakings or other undertakings in which a participation is held by insurance undertakings;
d. participatingundertakingsin insurance undertakingswithin the meaning of article 3(2), second indent,
in connection with article l(g) of the Insurance Groups Directive, i.e., parent undertakings of
insurance undertakings or other undertakings holding a participation in insurance undertakings;
e. related undertakings of a participatingundertaking in an insurance undertaking within the meaning of
articles 3(2), third indent; 5; 6; 8; 9d 10 of the Insurance Groups Directive, i.e., "sister undertakings" of an insurance undertaking;
f. credit institutionswithin the meaning of Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 1(1), i.e., any private
or public undertakings which correspond to the definition in article 1(1), first paragraph, of the
Banking Directive, and which have been authorized in a third country (see text, supra note 15);
g. financial institutionswithin the meaning of article 1(5) of the Banking Directive (see text, supra note
16); and
h. ancillary banking services undertakingswithin the meaning of article 1(23) of the Banking Directive,
i.e., undertakings whose principal activity consists of owning or managing property, managingdataprocessing services, or any other similar activity which is ancillary to the principal activity of one
or more credit institutions.
The solvency requirements for non-regulated financial sector entities that are not included in the sectoral
solvency requirement computation are computed on a notational basis. Notionalsolvency requirement means the
capital requirement such an entity would have to comply with according to the relevant sectoral rules if it were
a regulated entity of that particular financial sector; a mixed financial holding company shall be treated according to the sectoral rules of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate. Proposed
Directive, supra note 1,at Annex I(I)(2)(ii).
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The solvency requirements for each separate financial sector represented in a financial
conglomerate continue to be covered by own funds elements in accordance with the corresponding sectoral rulesY' Only own funds elements that are eligible according to each of
the sectoral rules (cross-sectorcapital) shall qualify for the verification of the compliance with
additional solvency requirements at the financial conglomerate level.92
Annex I sets forth three different methods for calculating the solvency position on the
level of a financial conglomerate. Although the Proposed Directive is not clear in this
respect, it is intended that the competent authorities have the choice as to which method
they apply to a financial conglomerate and they may also apply a combination of the three
methods. 93 These methods are accounting consolidation, deduction and aggregation, and
requirement deduction.
1. Method 1: "Accounting Consolidation" Method
Method 1 uses the consolidated accounts as a basis for calculating the supplementary
capital adequacy. Thus, it is only applicable for consolidated groups. According to this
method, the supplementary capital adequacy shall be calculated as the difference between:
a. The own funds of the financial conglomerate calculated on the basis of the consolidated position of the group;- and
b. The sum of the solvency requirements for each different financial sector represented
in the group.95
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to method 1:
Supp.CA = OFc,,,,,,Id,,d-(S,.k+ S

+-

+

SNon-Rgut)96

The difference shall not be negative.97
Because this method's starting point and basis are the fully consolidated accounts of the
financial conglomerate, by definition, all intra-group on- and off-balance sheet accounts or
exposures have been eliminated and the effects of double or multiple gearing and excessive
leverage are equated. Thus, calculating the group-wide capital adequacy simply consists in
the deduction of the solvency requirements of the group's sectors from the consolidated
own funds.

91. Proposed Directive, supra note I, at Annex I(l2)(ii).

92. Id.
93. Id. at Annex I(II)
Method 4. See also Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supranote 13,
at 2 & 4;Report of the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra
note 13,
at 34.
94. The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Proposed
Directive, supra
note 1,at Annex I(II)
Method I(i).
95. The solvency requirements for each different financial sector are calculated in accordance with the
relevant sectoral rules, id. at Annex I(II)
Method I (ii). In the case of non-regulated financial sector entities that
are not included in the sectoral solvency requirement calculations, a notional solvency requirement shall be
calculated. Id.; see supra note 90.
96. Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide
capital, OF shall mean own funds, and S shall mean the solvency requirements of a financial sector.
97. Proposed Directive, supra note 1,at Annex I(I1)
Method 1.If the difference is negative, the group faces
a capital deficit.
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2. Method 2: "Deduction and Aggregation" Method
The calculation of the supplementary capital adequacy pursuant to Method 2 is carried
out on the basis of the single accounts of each entity in the group. According to this method,
the supplementary capital adequacy shall be calculated on the basis of the accounts of each
of the entities in the group as the difference between:
a. The sum of the own funds of each regulated and non-regulated entity in the financial
9s
conglomerate; and
b. The sum of:
* The solvency requirements for each regulated and non-regulated entity in the
group;- and

" The book value of the participations in other entities of the group. 00
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to Method 2:
Supp.CA = (OF, + OF 2 + OF3 + . .. )[(S, + S2 + S, + .. .) + (BV, + BV2 + BV, ... )],0
10 2

The difference shall not be negative.
The effect of this method is to pretend the situation of consolidated accounts and, therefore to eliminate multiple gearing, excessive leverage, and the misuse of accounting margins
relating to the book value of participations by deducting those participations.
3. Method 3: "RequirementDeduction" Method
Method 3 is based on the balance sheet of each company within the group. According
to this method, the calculation of the supplementary capital adequacy shall be carried out
on the basis of the accounts of each of the entities in the group as the difference between:
a. The own funds of the parent undertaking or the entity at the head of the financial
conglomerate; °0 and
b. The sum of:
* The solvency requirement of the parent undertaking or the head referred to in clause
(a); and

98. The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Id. at Annex
I(II) Method 2(i).
99. The solvency requirements shall be calculated in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Id. at
Annex I(H) Method 2(ii). In the case of non-regulated entities, a notional solvency requirement shall be calculated. Id.; see supra note 90.
100. Although the wording in this point is not very clear, participationsin otherentities ofthe group means any
participation that is held within the group, e.g., participations of the parent in its subsidiaries or crossparticipations of the subsidiaries. See Joint Forum Report, supra note 5, at 9, sub. 20.
101. Supp.CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide
capital, OF shall mean own funds, S shall mean the solvency requirements of an entity of the group and BV
shall mean the book value of a participation.
102. Proposed Directive, supra note 1,at Annex I(I1) Method 2. If the difference is negative, the group faces
a capital deficit.
103. The elements eligible are those that qualify in accordance with the relevant sectoral rules, Id. at Annex
I(II) Method 3(i).
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- The higher of the book value of the parent undertaking's participation in other
entities in the group and these entities' solvency requirement.7 4
Formula for calculating the supplementary capital adequacy according to method 3:
1

Supp.CA = OF,

- [S ,,_. +

(BV, or S, + BV2 or S2 + BV3 or S 3

+

.. )]105

6°

0
The difference shall not be negative.
The competent authorities shall require regulated entities to have in place satisfactory
capital adequacy policies at the level of the financial conglomerate as well as appropriate
internal control mechanisms regarding capital adequacy.07 The competent authorities
responsible for exercising supplementary supervision may decide not to include a particlar entity for the purposes of calculating the capital adequacy requirements in the
following cases: 00

a. If the entity is situated in a third country where there are legal impediments to the
transfer of the necessary information, 0 9
b. If the entity is of negligible interest with respect to the objective of the supplementary
supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate, 0 or
c. If the inclusion of the entity would be inappropriate or misleading with respect to the
objectives of supplementary supervision.
If the capital adequacy position at the level of the financial conglomerate falls below the
requirements, if the capital adequacy policies are not adequate, if the internal control mechanisms are not appropriate, or where the requirements are met but the solvency may nevertheless be jeopardized,"' the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of the
regulated entities in the financial conglomerate must ensure that the necessary measures to
rectify the situation are taken by the entities in the group as soon as possible." '

104. The solvency requirements of the parent undertaking shall be taken into account for their proportional
share in accordance with Id. at Annex I, (1), Annex I, (H)Method 3(ii). In the case of non-regulated entities, a
notional solvency requirement shall be calculated. Id.; see supra note 90.
105. Stipp. CA shall mean the supplementary capital adequacy, i.e., the surplus or deficit of the group-wide
capital, OF shall mean the own funds of the parent undertaking on the basis of the single account, S shall mean
the solvency requirements and BVshall mean the book value of the parent's participation.
106. Proposed Directive, upra note 1,at Annex I(II) Method 3. If the difference is negative, the group faces
a capital deficit.
107. Id.art. 5(2).
108. Id.art. 5(4).
109. This exception must be without prejudice to the sectoral rules regarding the obligation of competent
authorities to refuse authorization where the effective exercise of their supervisory functions is prevented. Id.
art. 5(4)(a).

110.
theless
111.
112.

If several entities are intended to be excluded because of such negligible interest, they must be neverincluded when collectively they are of non-negligible interest. Id. art. 5(4).
The requirements are set forth in id. art. 5(2).
Id. art. 5(5).
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INTRA-GRouP TRANSACTIONS AND RISK CONCENTRATION

Another core regulation of the Proposed Directive is the requirement of supplementary
supervision on intra-group transactions"3 and risk concentration"4 of regulated entities in a
5
financial conglomerate."
Intra-group transactions may cause supervisory concerns when they: (i) result in capital
or income being inappropriately transferred from the regulated entity; (ii) are on terms or
under circumstances which parties operating at arm's length would not allow and may be
disadvantageous to a regulated entity; (iii) can adversely affect the solvency, the liquidity,
and the profitability of individual entities within a group; or (iv) are used as a means of
supervisory arbitrage, thereby evading capital or other regulatory requirements altogether. 16 Monitoring intra-group transactions is also an important factor in dealing with

the risk of contagion within a financial conglomerate. Contagion entails the risk that, if
certain parts of a conglomerate are experiencing financial difficulties, they may infect other
healthy parts of the conglomerate as a result of which the operation of the healthy parts
may be hampered or even made impossible."' Therefore, intra-group transactions can significantly exacerbate problems for a regulated entity once contagion spreads."As to the problem of risk concentration, supervisors of the different financial sectors use
various approaches to monitor large exposures, due to the different risks they are facing." 9

113. Intra-grouptransactionsmean all transactions by which regulated entities within a financial conglomerate
rely either directly or indirectly upon other entities within the same group for the fulfillment of an obligation,
whether or not contractual, whether or not for payment. Id. art. 2(16).
According to the Joint Forum, Report on Intra-Group Transaction and Exposure Principles (Dec. 1999),
amending the Report on Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, at 2, sub. 4, intra-grouptransactionsand
exposures take the form of direct and indirect claims between entities within a financial conglomerate. They can
originate in a variety of ways, for example, through: (a) cross shareholdings; (b) trading operations whereby
one group company deals with, or on behalf of, another group company; (c) central management of shortterm liquidity within the conglomerate; (d) guarantees, loans and commitments provided to, or received from,
other companies in the group; (e) the provision of management and other service arrangements, e.g., pension
arrangements or back office services; (f) exposures to major shareholders (including loans and off-balance sheet
exposures such as commitments and guarantees); (g) exposures arising through the placement of client assets
with other group companies; (h) purchase or sales of assets with other group companies; (i) transfer of risk
through reinsurance; and (j) transactions to shift third party-related risk exposures between entities within the
conglomerate.
114. According to article 2(17) of the Proposed Directive, risk concentrationmeans all exposures with a loss
potential borne by entities within a financial conglomerate, which are large enough to threaten the solvency
or the financial position in general of the regulated entities in the financial conglomerate, and which exposures
may be caused by counterparty risk/credit risk, investment risk, insurance risk, market risk, other risks, or a
combination or interaction of these risks.
Pursuant to the Joint Forum, Report on Risk Concentrations Principles (Dec. 1999), available at http://
www.iosco.org/download.pdf. 1999-joint forum-risk concentration.pdf, amending the Report on Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates, "[rlisk concentration can take many forms, including exposures to: (a) individual
counterparties; (b) groups of individual counterparties or related entities; (c) counterparties in specific geographical locations; (d) industry sectors; (e) specific products; () service providers, e.g., back office services;
and (g) natural disasters or catastrophes." Id. at 2, sub. 4.
115. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(1), in connection with Annex II.
116. Joint Forum, Report on Intra-Group Transaction and Exposure Principles, supra note 113, at 6, sub.
12. See also Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 21.
117. Tripartite Report, supra note 5, at 18, sub. 47.
118. Id. at 19, sub. 50.
119. See Joint Forum, Report on Risk Concentrations Principles, supra note 114, at 8, sub. nos. 8-10.
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In all three sectors, financial institutions face an increased risk of loss when their assets,
liabilities, or business activities are not diversified.1s As not all risk concentrations are inherently bad (a certain degree of concentration is the inevitable result of a well-articulated
business strategy as well as product specialization, the targeting of a customer base, or a
sound strategy of outsourcing data processing activities), supervisors need to balance the
benefits against the risks of concentrations at the conglomerate level.12 In identifying risks,
the competent authorities have to take into account the different ways in which large losses
can develop in a conglomerate as a result of risk concentration."'
To avoid the risks resulting from intra-group transactions and risk concentration, the EU
Member States or the competent authorities shall require regulated entities to have in place
within the financial conglomerate adequate risk management processes and internal control
mechanisms-including sound reporting and accounting procedures-in order to identify,
measure, monitor, and control the intra-group transactions within a financial conglomerate
and the risk concentration at the level of the financial conglomerate.23 However, the Proposed Directive does not provide for quantitative limits or standards with regard to intragroup transactions within a financial conglomerate and risk concentration at the level of the
financial conglomerate. The introduction of such limits or the introduction of other super24
visory measures that would achieve similar objectives is left to the EU Member States.
In addition, the Member States or the competent authorities shall require regulated
entities or mixed financial holding companies to report on a regular basis and, at least
annually, to the competent authority responsible for the supplementary supervision all significant intra-group transactions within the financial conglomerate, as well as any significant
risk concentration at the level of the financial conglomerate. 2 ' The intra-group transactions
and risk concentrations shall be subject to supervisory overview by the competent authorities responsible for supplementary supervision. 2 6 Therefore, the coordinator'" and the

120. Id. at 5,sub. II.
121. Id. at 7, sub. nos. 22, 23.
122. Id. at 7, sub. 23. The Report addresses some of them as follows:
* Losses at the conglomerate level can reflect the aggregate of losses on similar types of exposures (e.g., bonds, loans, and investments with the same obligor) across the sectors.
* Losses could reflect risk factors that have consequences for different types of exposures in
different entities (e.g., a natural disaster could cause insurance loses in a conglomerate's
insurance operation and credit losses in its banking operation if both offered products in the
affected region).
* Losses could reflect the interaction of risk factors (e.g., the loss potential in a derivative or
exchange rate contract resulting from an exchange rate depreciation may be intensified if the
same price movement adversely affects the repayment ability of a counterparty or the financial
stability of the counterparty's country of residence).
* Losses could also reflect the breakdown of previously observed correlations, such as occurs
in a flight to quality in which all risky assets decline in value, where previously many of them
were measured to be uncorrelated.
123. Proposed Directive, supra
note I, art. 6(2). According to the second paragraph of Annex HI,the competent authorities responsible for supplementary supervision shall in particular monitor the possible risk of
contagion in the financial conglomerate, the risk of a conflict of interests, the risk of circumvention of sectoral
rules, and the level of volume of risks.
124. Id. art. 6(4).
125. Id. art. 6(3), in connection with Annex II.
126. Id.
127. Seeinfra IV.D. for a discussion of the coordinator.
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competent authorities responsible for sectoral group-wide supervision of the regulated entities in a financial conglomerate shall identify and agree with each other on the type of
transactions and risks regulated entities in a particular financial conglomerate shall report
in accordance with the provisions on reporting of intra-group transactions and risk concentration. 2 8 Thus, the Proposed Directive provides for the development of reporting requirements that are specific for each financial conglomerate.
When a financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company, the
sectoral rules regarding intra-group transactions and risk concentration of the largest financial sector in the financial conglomerate shall apply to the financial conglomerate as a
2 9
whole, including the mixed financial holding company.
The Proposed Directive gives the competent authorities responsible for supervising the
regulated entities in the financial conglomerate the power to enforce compliance with the
rules on intra-group transactions and risk concentration against such regulated entities and,
130
where appropriate, against other entities in the group. Where the intra-group transactions or risk concentrations are a threat to the regulated entities' financial position, the
3
competent authorities shall take appropriate measures.' '
In the banking sector, the Proposed Directive introduces amendments concerning intragroup transactions. The Proposed Directive would amend the Banking Directive' to provide that, where the parent undertaking of one or more credit institutions is a mixed-activity
holding company, the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of these credit
institutions shall exercise general supervision over transactions between the credit institution and the mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries.' In addition, the competent authorities must require credit institutions to have in place adequate risk management processes and internal control mechanisms, including sound reporting and accounting
procedures, in order to identify, measure, monitor, and control transactions with their par5
ent mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries appropriately. 1 The proposed
amendment to the Banking Directive does not establish objective standards for the permissibility of intra-group transactions.'

128. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, at Annex II (referring to the reporting provision of article 6(3)).
When defining the type of transactions and risks, the relevant competent authorities shall take into account
the specific group and risk management structure of the financial conglomerate. In particular, the relevant
competent authorities shall define appropriate thresholds based on regulatory own funds and/or technical
provisions. Id.
129. Id. art. 6(5). According to the wording of article 6(5) the sectoral rules of the largest sector in the
financial conglomerate shall apply to that [largest] sector. However, that does not seem to make sense. Article
6(5) probably means that the sectoral rules of the largest sector shall apply to the whole group.
130. Id. art. 6(6).
131. Id.
132. Text, supra note 2.

133. Proposed Directive, supranote 1,art. 25(7) (proposing to add a new article 55a to the Banking Directive,
supra note 2).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Section 23A and 23 B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C, 371c, 371c-1 (2000). New art.
55a, Banking Directive, supra note 2, proposed to be added by article 25(7) of the Proposed Directive, provides
that where the intra-group transactions are a threat to a credit institution's financial position, the competent
authority responsible for the supervision of the institution shall take appropriate measures.
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MANAGEMENT QUALIFICATIONS

The Proposed Directive provides that in the case where the business of an insurance
undertaking, life insurance undertaking, investment firm, or a credit institution is codirected by persons appointed in a different legal entity, or where persons appointed in a
different legal entity have a material influence on the direction of the insurance undertaking,
life insurance undertaking, investment firm, or credit institution, those persons must prove
sufficient good repute and appropriate professional qualifications or experience to perform
their duties. 136 These provisions are intended to ensure that a manager or co-director of a
non-regulated entity having a dominant influence on the performance of a regulated entity
is reliable, like a manager of the regulated entity. This provision responds to the recent
tendency to manage financial conglomerates along the different business lines of conglomerates instead of the traditional legal entity based approaches.'
D.

MEASURES TO FACILITATE SUPPLEMENTARY SUPERVISION

As mentioned above, one of the principal objectives of the Proposed Directive is the
introduction of measures to facilitate supplementary supervision."' Supplementary supervision requires the exchange of information among the entities in the financial conglomerate
and exchange of information and cooperation among the competent authorities involved
in the supervision of regulated entities in a particular financial conglomerate.139
The Proposed Directive introduces the so-called coordinator.The competent authorities
of the Member States concerned shall appoint amongst them a coordinator responsible for
the coordination and exercise of the supplementary supervision of the regulated entities in
a financial conglomerate." 40 The coordinator functions merely as a primus interparesof the
competent authorities of the Member States involved with the regulated entities of a financial conglomerate." 4 A coordinator must be nominated not only for cross-border
financial conglomerates but also for financial conglomerates that have several regulated
entities in one Member State and at least two supervisory authorities are involved.42 In the
absence of an agreement among the competent authorities regarding the selection of a
coordinator, the coordinator is identified on the basis of criteria set forth in the Pro4
posed Directive." 3
136. Proposed Directive amending the First Non-Life Insurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 18(l) no.
(1); Proposed Directive amending the First Life Assurance Directive, supra note 2, art. 19(l) no. (2); Proposed
Directive amending the Investment Services Directive, supra note 2, art. 23(1) no. (6); and Proposed Directive
amending the Banking Directive, supra note 2, art. 25(2) no. (8).
137. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7, sub. 2 (arts. 5 and 6).
138. Proposed Directive, supra note 2, arts. 7-13.
139. Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7, sub. 2 (arts. 7 to 13).
140. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, arts. 7(1), (2). The coordinator may be composed of more than one
competent authority. Id. art. 7(1). The competent authorities of the Member State in which a mixed financial
holding company is set up participate in the selection of the coordinator. Id. art. 7(2).
141. See Economic and Financial Committee, Report on FinancialStability (Apr. 2000), EFC/ECFIN/240/00
Final,
available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/publications/economic-papers/2001/
ecpl43en.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2002).
142. See Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(b)(ii). Although the language of the Proposed Directive
is not clear, it follows from article 7(2)(b)(ii), third paragraph that the competent authorities that appoint a
coordinator may all be located in one Member State.
143. Id. art. 7(2).
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The tasks of the coordinator regarding supplementary supervision are:'4 (i) the coordination of gathering and disseminating relevant or essential information in going concern
and emergency situations; (ii) the assessment of the financial situation, and the overview and
monitoring of the compliance with the rules on capital adequacy, risk concentration, and
intra-group transactions; 45 (iii) the assessment of the financial conglomerate's structure,
organization, and internal control systems; and (iv) the planning and coordination of supervisory activities in a going concern as well as in emergency situations, in cooperation
with the relevant competent authorities involved.
The coordinator has no decision-making or enforcement authority to impose measures
and sanctions. 46 The presence of a coordinator entrusted with specific tasks of supplementary supervision does not affect the tasks and responsibilities of the competent authorities responsible for the regulated entities in a financial conglomerate as provided by the
47
sectoral rules.1
To ensure proper supplementary supervision, the competent authorities responsible for
supervising regulated entities in a financial conglomerate are required to cooperate
closely.' 4 They shall provide each other with any information that is essential or relevant
for the exercise of the other competent authorities' supervisory tasks, and provide the coordinator with any information that is relevant for the exercise of his task. 19 Upon request,
the competent authorities shall communicate all relevant information and shall communicate on their own initiative all essential information.1ss The competent authorities shall
consult with each other when the following decisions are important for the supervisory
tasks of other competent authorities: (i) changes in shareholder, organizational, or management structure ofregulated entities in a financial conglomerate, that require the approval
or authorization of competent authorities; and (ii) major sanctions or exceptional measures
taken by the competent authorities.'
E.

PARENT UNDERTAKINGS OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION

If the parent undertaking of a financial conglomerate is a regulated entity or a mixed
financial holding company having its head office outside the EU, the regulated entities in
the EU belonging to such an "non-EU group" cannot be subject to the same rules on
supplementary supervision as regulated entities in an "EU group," however, the Proposed
Directive attempts to apply as much supplementary supervision as possible."' The competent authority of the EU Member State must verify whether the regulated entities in the
EU, the parent undertaking of which has its head office outside the EU, are subject to

144. Id. art. 8(1).
145. See id. arts. 5, 6.
146. See Report of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, supra note 13, at 4, sub. 2.
147. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
148. Id. art. 9(l).
149. Id.
150. Id. Article 9(1) enumerates eight categories of information that shall be gathered and exchanged. Member States shall authorize the exchange of information between the competent authorities and between the
competent authorities and other authorities as referred to in articles 9(1) and (2).
151. Id.
152. Id. arts. 4(3), 14. See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7, sub. 2 (art. 14).
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supervision by a third country competent authority that is equivalent to the supplementary
supervision of regulated entities of the Proposed Directive." 3 The verification shall be done
by the authority that would be responsible for the supplementary supervision in the absence
of equivalent supervision by the third country.14 The Member State of such authority must
then notify the Commission and the other Member States of each case of equivalent supervision it has recognized or intends to recognize. If within two months of such notice an
objection is raised by a Member State or the Commission regarding the equivalence of
such supervision the Commission must subject the matter to a regulatory procedure.' 55
Whereas the U.S. rules on comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis1 6 ask
whether the foreign bank having an establishment in the United States is properly supervised by its home country, the Proposed Directive asks whether the EU affiliates of the
foreign entity are subject to (supplementary) supervision by the non-EU regulation of the
non-EU parent company.
In the absence of such equivalent supervision, EU Member States shall apply, by analogy,
the provision with regard to supplementary supervision of regulated entities set forth in the
Proposed Directive.'1" As an alternative to the application of the supplementary supervision
rules by analogy, the Member States may allow their competent authorities to apply other
methods that ensure an appropriate supplementary supervision of the regulated entities in
a financial conglomerate.ss In particular, the competent authorities may require the creation of a sub-holding company (which would be a mixed financial holding company) that
has its head office in the EU, and apply the supplementary supervision to the regulated
entities in the financial conglomerate headed by the European sub-holding company 5 9 In
any case, the methods selected by the competent authorities to ensure appropriate supplementary supervision must achieve the objectives set out in the Proposed Directive and must
be announced to the other Member States and the Commission.60 This notice triggers the
procedure set forth above: if within two months of such notice an objection is raised by a
Member State or the Commission regarding the equivalence of supplementary supervision,
the Commission must subject the matter to a regulatory procedure.' 6,
The Proposed Directive, unlike the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act, does not attempt
to regulate non-EU holding companies that control regulated entities in the EU. The

153. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(1) referring to the provisions on supplementary supervision
in article 4(2).
154. Id. art. 14(1); see id. art. 14(2).
155. Id. art. 14(1), in connection with art. 17(2). The regulatory procedure is laid down in article 5 of Council
Decision 1999/468/EC of 28June 1999 Laying Down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers
Conferred on the Commission, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23. See Proposed Directive, supra note 1, arts. 9(3), 14(1),
17(2).
156. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.92(e)(1) & (2) (2002) (Regulation Y); 12 C.F.R. § 211.24(c)(l)(i)(A) (2002) (Regulation K); 12 C.F.R. § 225.13(a)(4) (2002) (Regulation Y).
157. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(2). The provision referred to in article 14(2) is article 4(2).
See supra part C. It is not clear what application "by analogy" means. Presumably, it means "to the extent
possible."
158. Id. art. 14(3). According to the second sentence of article 14(3)of the Proposed Directive, those methods
must be agreed upon at least by the authorities responsible for the sectoral group-wide supervision of the
regulated entities in the financial conglomerate and where relevant by other authorities concerned. Id.
159. Id. art. 14(3).
160. Id.
161. Id. in connection with art. 14(I); see text, supra note 155.
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Member States, together with the Commission, may assess the equivalence of the supplementary supervision by the non-EU home state of parent companies having a head office
outside the EU over EU-regulated entities. In the absence of a finding of equivalence, the
Member States may require the formation of an EU sub-financial conglomerate. This subgroup would not be insulated against acts by the non-EU holding company. The Proposed
Directive states however, that the creation of an EU sub-financial conglomerate "must
'1 62
achieve the objectives of the supplementary supervision as defined in this Directive.'
V. Conclusion
The growing consolidation process in the financial industry has created a number of new
prudential risks that must be faced. The Proposed Directive marks an important step in
keeping supervisory instruments up with the development of an integrated world financial
market. It is a significant step in the right direction. However, some weaknesses in the
Proposed Directive should be pointed out.
The high degree of discretion given to the Member States and their supervisory authorities could lead to enormous differences in the definition of financial conglomerates and in
national supervisory rules and practices relating to financial conglomerates throughout the
EU. This would not only create legal uncertainties but could also cause competitive distortions.'63 Generally speaking, it would be preferable to reduce the national options in
the directive.
Under the current version of the Proposed Directive, it is extremely difficult to determine
which groups are financial conglomerates and to determine which undertakings should be
subject to supplementary supervision. The definition of a group is extremely complicated
and hard to understand. In addition, the Member States have much discretion in that regard.
Therefore, the Finnish Delegation and the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs proposed different approaches to define a group by simplifying
and narrowing the definition.- These organizations have also suggested that a procedure
for identifying a financial conglomerate be established.65
Some commentators have expressed the view that the 50 percent threshold in article 3(1)
of the Proposed Directive, defining whether the activities of a group consist mainly in
providing financial services,'6 6 should be lowered. Otherwise large industrial groups with
significant financial activities would not be covered by the directive and could consequently

162. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(3). In light of the U.S. rule that excludes foreign banks that,
inthe view of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, are not comprehensively and on a
consolidated basis supervised in their home country, see supra note 156, it surprises that Harvey Pitt, Former
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, expressed "considerable concern" about the equivalent
supervision requirement of article 14(1) of the Proposed Directive. See Speech by SEC Chairman Harvey L.
Pitt: Remarks at the Financial Times' Conference on Regulations & Integration of the International Capital
Markets, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch588.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2002). A finding of
lack of equivalence of supervision does not create an entry barrier (as does a finding of lack of comprehensive
supervision in the case of foreign banks) but only leads to a modified application of supplementary supervision.
163. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 13, at 4, sub. 3.7.
164. See Note of the Finnish Delegation, supra note 13, at 3; Report of the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra note 13, at 7.
165. See Opinion of the European Central Bank, supranote 13, at 11, sub. 5; Note of the Finnish Delegation,
supra note 13, at 5.
166. Proposed Directive, supra note 1,art. 3(1) is discussed supra part III.B.
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escape any form of supervision.' 6' The question should be raised as to why the relative size
of financial services as compared to non-financial services in a conglomerate is a relevant
consideration. All credit institutions that are subsidiaries of principally non-financial conglomerates remain exposed to the dangers from which the Proposed Directive is intended
to protect them.
The computation of capital adequacy on the level of the financial conglomerate is of
limited value because the capital of entities in one sector is not available to regulated entities
in another sector, and the formulas for the computations of capital on the financial conglomerate level are flawed because the items that constitute capital in each sector differ.
The Proposed Directive does not propose a "source of strength" doctrine pursuant to which
a holding company is obligated to support a regulated entity subsidiary with its other subsidiaries' assets. 6 The Proposed Directive provides that the competent supervisory authority decides which of the methods for calculating supplementary capital adequacy should
be applied.169 It would be desirable to leave the selection of the calculation method to the
financial conglomerate in order to give companies more flexibility. 70
Finally, it is quite astonishing to note that the Proposed Directive hesitates to regulate
non-EU holding companies directly."' Banking legislation in the United States does not
show such hesitation with respect to foreign holding companies. For example, the U.S.
Bank Holding Company Act applies not only to U.S. banks but also to foreign banks that
have a U.S. bank subsidiary"' and to foreign banks that maintain a branch, agency, or
commercial lending company in the United States."'

167. SeeReport of the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra note
13, at 33; Position Paper of the Banking Federation of the European Union, supra note 13, at 6.
168. Under the so-called source of strength doctrine, a U.S. bank holding company (and indirectly its
subsidiaries) is expected to support the deposit-taking subsidiaries in case of need. SeeBoard of Governors v.
First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234 (1978); M Corp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on othergrounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991); Policy Statement of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (Apr. 30, 1987); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1)
(2002) Regulation Y); Section 5(g)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(g)(1)
(2000).
169. See Proposed Directive, supra note 1, at Annex I(II) Method 4 discussed supra part IV.A.
170. See Report of the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, supra note
13, at 28, 34; Position Paper of the Banking Federation of the European Union, supra note 13, at 11.
171. See Proposed Directive, supra note I, arts. 4(3), 14 as discussed supra part W.E.
172. The Bank Holding Company Act applies directly to such foreign banks.
173. Section 8(a), Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1994). For a further discussion of supervision
of foreign banks in the United States, see I REGULATION oF FoREIGN BANs, UNITED STATEs AND INTERNATIONAL,

supra note 23.
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Addendum
The Directive on Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates as it has been
modified by the Commission in its Common Position as of September 12, 2002 (OJ. 2002/
C 253 E/01), and as it was adopted by the European Parliament on November 20, 2002,
differs in some, although not in major, respects from the Proposed Directive. The publication of the Directive in the Official Journal will follow shortly.
1. The definition of group (supranote 42) was simplified by the elimination of the "close

link" requirement. Group is defined in the Directive by a parent-subsidiary relationship or
a relationship based on participation (supra note 17), except that a group also covers relationship within the meaning of art. 12(1) of the Consolidated Accounts Directive (so-called
"horizontal structures") (supra note 42 sub c). The inclusion of horizontal structures is left
to national discretion. By eliminating the close link requirement from the definition of
group, the Directive responds to a major criticism of the Proposed Directive. The concept
of close link is still used to define intra-group transactions,art. 2(18) of the Directive (supra
part IV B & note 42).
2. The thresholds for identifying afinancialconglomerate (suprapart III B) were amended
in several minor respects: (a) for the purpose of determining whether the activities of a
group mainly occur in the financial sector, the ratio of the balance sheet total of the regulated and non-regulated financial sector entities in the group to the balance sheet total of
the group as a whole must exceed 40 percent (rather than 50 percent as required in the
Proposed Directive, supra text accompanying note 48), art. 3(1) of the Directive; (b) for the
purposes of determining whether the activities in different financial sectors are significant,
for each financial sector (i) the average of the ratio of the balance sheet total of that financial
sector to the balance sheet total of the financial sector entities in the group and (ii) the ratio
of the solvency requirements of the same financial sector entities to the total solvency
requirements of the financial sector entities in the group, must exceed 10 percent, art. 3(2)
of the Directive; (c) cross-sectoral activities are presumed to be significant if the balance
sheet total of the smallest financial sector in the group exceeds EUR 6 billion (however, if
the group does not reach the 10 percent threshold referred to under (b) above, the relevant
competent authorities may agree not to regard the group as a financial conglomerate), art.
3(3) of the Directive, and (d) for the determination whether the cross-sectoral activities are
significant (supra III B 2) the competent authorities may by common agreement take into
account compliance with the threshold within a period of three consecutive years, art. 3(4)
of the Directive. The term significant is referred to in art. 2(14)(e) of the Directive.
3. The rules regarding the choice of the method for calculating a financial conglomerate's solvency requirement (supra text accompanying note 93) were modified in Annex I of
the Directive. Accordingly, Member States may require that the calculation be carried out
according to one particular method among those described in Annex I if a financial conglomerate is headed by a regulated entity that has been authorized in that Member State.
Where a financial conglomerate is not headed by a regulated entity within the meaning of
Article 1 of the Directive, Member States shall authorize the application of any of the
methods described in Annex I, except in situations where the relevant competent authorities
are located in the same Member State, in which case that Member State may require the
application of one of the methods. Without prejudice to the provisions of the foregoing,
Member States shall allow their competent authorities, where they assume the role of
WINTER 2002
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coordinator with regard to a particular financial conglomerate, to decide, after consultation
with the other relevant competent authorities and the conglomerate itself, which method
shall be applied by that financial conglomerate.
4. The Directive now explicitly states, in line with the Commission's objectives, that
sectoral risks are to be covered by sectoral capital according to the sectoral rules, and that
any additional deficit at conglomerate level should be covered by cross-sectoral capital, art.
6 of the Directive (see supra text accompanying notes 91 & 92).
5. The Directive has changed the process of the appointment of the coordinator (supra
text accompanying note 140). The Directive provides for the automatic identification of
the coordinator on the basis of objective criteria (supratext accompanying note 143), which
may be waived subsequently by common agreement of the relevant competent authorities
after consultation of the financial conglomerate, art. 10 of the Directive.
6. With respect to financial undertakings that are active in the European Union but have
a parent undertaking outside the European Union (supra part IV E), new art. 18(1) of the
Directive departs from art. 14(1) of the Proposed Directive by replacing the procedures for
the notification and objection against a coordinator's decision on the equivalence of a third
country's regime with an obligatory consultation procedure that requires the coordinator
to consult the other relevant competent authorities and the Financial Conglomerates Committee (see art. 17 of the Proposed Directive and art. 21 of the Directive) and take into
account guidance of the Committee composed of representatives of the Member States.
Furthermore, art. 18(1) of the Directive provides that in the case of absence of equivalence,
Member States shall (not may as it was provided in art. 14(3) of the Proposed Directive,
supra text accompanying note 158) allow the competent authorities to use alternative methods for ensuring appropriate supervision of such groups.
7. A new article 4 of the Directive requires the competent authorities to abide by explicit
procedures for the identification of a financial conglomerate. If a competent authority is of
the opinion that a regulated entity authorized by that authority is a member of a group that
may be a financial conglomerate, which has not already been identified according to the
Directive, the competent authority shall communicate its view to the other competent
authorities concerned. The coordinator shall inform the parent undertaking (in the absence
of a parent undertaking, the regulated entity with the largest balance sheet total in the most
important financial sector in a group) that the group has been identified as a financial
conglomerate and of the appointment of the coordinator. The coordinator shall also inform
the competent authorities that have authorized regulated entities in the group and the
competent authorities of the Member State in which the mixed financial holding company
has its head office, as well as the Commission. This procedure will add to the transparency
of the implementation process of the Directive.
8. A new art. 30 of the Directive deals with asset management companies by providing
that the Member States will decide according to which sectoral rules these asset management companies will have to be included in group-wide supervision, and that the Commission will make a report on Member States' practices and propose for the harmonization
of EU legislation if necessary.
9. Many articles of the proposed Directive were renumbered in the Directive. For instance, certain provisions were moved from Annex I to art. 6 of the Directive (see, e.g., supra
notes 90 & 91); provisions dealing with risk concentration and intra-group transactions
were moved from art. 6 of the Proposed Directive to art. 7 (risk concentration) and art. 8
(intra-group transactions) of the Directive.
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